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ABSTRACT 
This paper attempts to examine the development of the Zheng family’s trading activities in the Malay 
Archipelago, especially during the time of Zheng Chenggong, when the family had to compete with the 
Dutch in the Straits of Malacca. For this purpose, the qualitative analytical approaches are employed 
with reference to the primary sources of the Western and Chinese travellers during the 17th century, 
namely, Willem Ysbrandsz Bontekoe and George Hughes, apart from the gazettes annotated by Li 
Jinming and Liao Da Ke. In addition, secondary sources, such as the books, monographs, articles and 
journals written by some distinguished scholars in the field of international maritime research have 
been studied. The works of Patrizia Carioti, Leonard Blusse, Meilink-Roelofsz and Xing Hang, among 
others, have also been investigated for their critical views and arguments. In sum, this study aims to 
show that trade conflicts and competition between the Zheng family and the Dutch in the 17th century 
have impacted particularly the Chinese traders in the Malay Archipelago. This is because both of these 
powers are seen trying to assume the role which had hitherto been played by these Chinese merchants 
as a strong competitor in the marine trade in the east and southeast of the Malay Archipelago. In this 
regard, discussions on this topic would contribute to a better understanding of the big powers 
competing in the region to dominate the Straits of Malacca. Additionally, this study sets to prove that 
private trading activities in the Malay Archipelago which flourished during the 17th century was built 
and developed by the Zheng family from Taiwan and not merely attributed to the Chinese traders from 
China. 
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The well-known members in the Zheng family were Zheng Zhilong (Cheng Chih-lung) alias 
Nicholas Iquan (c. 1604-1662) and his son, Zheng Chenggong (Cheng Ch’eng-kung) alias 
Koxinga (1624-1662). Zheng Chenggong was bestowed the title of Guo-xing-ye or Lord of the 
Imperial Surname. Since the title was pronounced as ‘Kok-seng-ia’ in Fujianese, he came to 
be known to the Dutch and other westerners as Koxinga. The Zheng family had succeeded in 
establishing a trading empire which enjoyed glorious success during its era in the South Sea 
(read: Malay Archipelago). However, according to Moloughney (1986), between 1661 and 
1684 the ‘maritime prohibitions’ (haijin), which were implemented to bring pressure to bear 
on the Ming loyalist forces of the Zheng family network based in Formosa (now Taiwan), saw 
ports closed and ships forbidden to leave the Chinese shore. Almost all ships that sailed to 
Taiwan or through Batavia (now Jakarta) during that period were controlled or owned by the 
Zheng family.  
Zheng Zhilong was born in a fishing village in Fujian in 1604. When he reached adulthood, 
he went to Macau in search of a better life. Over there, he was baptized and admitted to the 
Portuguese Catholic Church, and was given the Christian name of Jaspar. He was also known 
as Nicolas Iquan. With the help of the Portuguese, Zhilong learnt Lusitanian, the common 
language used by the European traders in the Far East. By 1620, one of the prominent pirates 
in the region was Yan Siji, who was from Fujian. Although Yan Siji appeared to be a legitimate 
trader, he had in fact, cunningly merged a legitimate trade with the activities of pirate gangs, 
giving rise to the Yan group as the strongest organization in the Malay Archipelago. Yan Siji 
forged the alliance with the small pirate groups by exacting loyalty and the pledge of full 
allegiance to his group. At that time, Zheng Zhilong was one of the captains in the Yan’s pirate 
activities (Yang, 1976).   
Earlier on, Zhilong worked under the Dutch as a translator and privateer for a period of 
time in Taiwan. Then, in 1623, he tried his luck in Hirado (Nagasaki), Japan where he had the 
chance to get acquainted with a wealthy trader named Li Dan, who came from Quanzhou 
province. Li Dan (or Captain China, as the Dutch and the English knew him) controlled the 
Chinese trade with Japan and was ruling the small Chinese trading community the Dutch found 
in Tayouan when they arrived there (Zhuang, 2000; Carioti, 2012). Thanks to Zhilong’s 
competence and dedication to his work, he gained Li Dan’s confidence with ease. Eventually, 
he was given the responsibility of handling Li Dan’s business dealings with Japan and the 
countries in the Malay Archipelago. In Japan, he married Tagawa Matsu from the Tagawa 
family and gave birth to their first child, Zheng Chenggong. After Li Dan’s death, Zhilong took 
over his entire commercial fleet in the sea trade (Carioti, 1996).  
In the year 1624, Zhilong was reported to have returned to Taiwan in order to strengthen 
his pirate-trade activities by joining Yan Siji as a result of the enforcement of a ban on ocean 
trade by the Japanese. Taiwan by then, had emerged as an important pirate base for establishing 
trade relations with China and Japan. It was afterwards that the Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish, 
and Dutch joined in the trade which turned Taiwan into the main sea base in the Eastern Sea. 
Later on, Zhilong became one of the most respected pirates, albeit a much feared one in the 
Malay Archipelago. He was described as a noble Robin Hood-style criminal. Like Robin 
Hood’s character, he ran his modus operandi of robbing the rich and handing over the loot to 
the poor.  Many narratives about his admirable act to help the poor have been recorded. 
According to Andrade (2000), in 1627, when a severe famine struck Fujian, Zhilong helped the 
Journal of Nusantara Studies 2018, Vol 3(2) 54-65 
http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol3iss2pp54-65 




victims cross the Taiwan Straits and subsequently settled them in Formosa by giving them land, 
cattle, and equipment to work with.  
2.0 THE EMERGENCE OF THE ZHENG FAMILY’S PRIVATE TRADE EMPIRE  
Zheng Zhilong’s group later on focused its trading activities in Fujian’s southern province, 
specifically by building its base of strength on the Xiamen and Jinmen islands. These islands 
served as terminal points for the trade routes across East Asia and the Malay Archipelago, from 
Japan to the Straits of Malacca. The base, unfortunately for the group, did not last long because 
of a coup by the Manchu faction against the Ming dynasty. However, the existing links and 
routes had opened up a new chapter in trade relations between Fujian and the Malay 
Archipelago. In addition, it is noted that trade in Batavia reached its peak in 1657 when a total 
of 93 ships from China stopped over for dealings with Batavia as exerted by Li (1996). In the 
interim period (1640-46) between the collapse of the Ming dynasty and the establishment of 
the Qing dynasty and the death of Yan Siji in 1626, Zheng Zhilong managed to control almost 
all the trade in the South Sea with Japan, the Malay Archipelago and even parts of the 
Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch colonies. As claimed by Chao (2005), Zheng Zhilong had 
undoubtedly become one of the richest moguls of the early modern world through commerce 
with different ports across the East and with the Malay Archipelago by the 1630s. 
Contemporary accounts note that his income totalled “tens of millions of [silver] taels per 
year,” and his assets “rivalled that of entire nations.” (Chao, 2005, p. 260). 
According to Blusse (1988), during the period from 1600 to 1800, approximately a hundred 
Chinese boats with a cargo of about 20,000 tons sailed over the years to the Malay Archipelago, 
providing employment opportunities in shipping activities for thousands. Xing (2016), 
estimating the trading value per vessel between the Zheng family and the Malay Archipelago 
at 80,000 (3 tons) to 100,000 taels (3.7 tons), concludes that Zheng and his followers made 
630,000 taels (23.6 tons) each year from the Malay Archipelago market. Xing (2016) continues 
that during the late Ming, the Zheng family began sailing in large numbers further out into the 
ocean; to Japan and the Malay Archipelago to take advantage of the high demand for the 
lucrative Chinese exports. From the three coastal provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian and 
Guangdong, the Zheng family again expanded its trading network all the way to the Straits of 
Malacca and the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, Viraphol (1977) discloses that its trade with Siam 
in particular, could fetch a profit of 40,000 (1.4 tons) to 50,000 taels (1.9 tons) from each round 
trip journey. 
Misfortune fell on the Zheng family in November 1646 when Zheng Zhilong, who was in 
Fuzhou, supposedly to be appointed as Viceroy of Fujian and Guangdong, was instead arrested 
and imprisoned, and eventually killed in Beijing by the Qing ruler. The planned assassination 
came about because the Qing dynasty believed that the growth of the Zheng family’s marine 
trade empire seemed to have interfered with the international relationships of China’s tributary-
based system. China believed that only its tributary system could permit trade. It was always 
because of ‘the tributary that trade exists’ when China established its external relations with 
the territories on its shores.  
Having further strengthened the family’s trading empire after the death of his father, Zheng 
Chenggong faced some difficulties in mobilising his troops and accumulated economic 
resources from his maritime trade with Japan and the Malay Archipelago. Therefore, he 
resorted to sending a number of traders and an ‘adopted son’ to the Malay Archipelago to 
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control the trade. Men such as Hong Xu (d. 1666), Zhilong’s adopted son and Zheng 
Chenggong’s half-brother, Zheng Tai (d. 1663), shared in the profits of the family’s vast trading 
network in their own rights. However, those who did not trade by their own efforts and yet 
gained excess to the network were the adopted sons of the powerful and wealthy gentry in 
Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. Others, with a more independent identity, often could not 
afford their own junks and had to employ the services of the specialised individual ship-owners 
or hire cargo space on vessels directly from the Zheng’s Oceanic Five Firms (Xing, 2010). 
Besides these officially sanctioned entrepreneurs, independent merchants and artisans all along 
the coast maintained a cooperative relationship with the organization. Indeed, the Zheng 
network served as one of the very few access points to the highly lucrative foreign commerce 
while its powerful naval fleet stood ready to protect the lives and assets of the private traders 
from harassment. Zheng Chenggong’s intention was only to ensure his stranglehold on the 
trade links which had already been monopolised by his family’s empire. By the same token, 
the overseas Chinese merchants also relied upon the Zheng family as the key provider of 
products from China, and turned to him for assistance in the event of conflicts with their own 
native rulers (Xing, 2010). 
The rise of the Zheng family in the Malay Archipelago coincided with the expansion of the 
Dutch and other European powers, namely the Spaniards and the British, in the area. In 
elaborating on the Zheng’s relations with the countries in the Malay Archipelago, Nie (1994) 
believe that in the course of the competition between the Chinese and the Dutch East India 
Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or VOC, 1602-1800), Zheng Chenggong 
managed to finally eliminate the Dutch power and threat to give the Zheng empire the sole 
authority over the sea to protect the activities and interests of the merchants in the Malay 
Archipelago. Unlike the Chinese who wanted only to trade, the VOC not only traded but caused 
the depletion of the resources available in the Malay Archipelago. 
3.0 MARITIME CONNECTIVITY IN THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO: ZHENG 
CHENGGONG AND THE DUTCH  
After the Dutch had captured Malacca from the Portuguese in 1641, they tightened their control 
over the Straits of Malacca up to Singapore to ensure that their monopoly of activities in 
Malacca continued to be maintained. Wright (1958) points out that the Dutch monopoly policy 
was aimed at getting rid of their rivals and the setting up of placements along the trade routes 
mainly to expand their trade. The Dutch felt threatened if any of the other European powers 
interfered with the spice trade and other trade activities in the East, such as, when these nations 
attempted to wrest from the Dutch the exclusive contracts with the lesser princes of the Malay 
Archipelago, who were required to sell their products only to the Dutch. To thwart such efforts 
by the other European competitors, the Dutch established many camps and placed troops in 
several straits paths so that no trading vessel could pass without their permission. Their contract 
system was enforced extensively and as a result, the Portuguese and Chinese traders were 
forced to pay duties to pass through the Straits of Malacca. If a ship by accident avoided paying 
taxes, the ship which arrived later was compelled to pay for both vessels (Bradell, 1856).  
In 1667, instructions were issued to the patrol vessels to be more vigilant in the case of 
ships operated by the Chinese, especially the Zheng family from Taiwan. All these Chinese 
vessels were declared as enemy ships. The Dutch continued to adhere to the belief that as soon 
as the Chinese ships of Zheng Chenggong had berthed, they must be taken over whether by 
force using weapons or in other practical ways. The Dutch authorities also informed their 
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captains that killing was permitted even though the drastic action should be avoided whenever 
possible. However, in the event of fierce opposition and enigmatic constraints, the Zheng 
Chenggong Chinese crew must first be killed except in isolated cases where they could be 
guarded and controlled by the captain of the ship. Instructions were issued against taking any 
action after a ship was seized (Leupe, 1936). According to the directive, no further drastic 
action would be allowed other than the normal hijacking of the Chinese crew from the seized 
vessels. Subsequently, the ship’s door should be closed immediately as the entire cargo would 
be delayed and eventually the seized vessels would be handed over to the authorities in Malacca 
(Purcell, 1967). 
Meanwhile, the Chinese traders who were biologically unrelated to the Zheng family, were 
asked to continue sailing to Malacca. The custom was to inform this Chinese group of their 
choices based on the suitability and the nature of their respective trades. The instructions issued 
by the Dutch authorities to the captains of the Dutch ship were as follows, 
You must accompany them with the excuse to control and observe them 
from the coast of Johor. Because their voyage was over a long distance, 
you should advise them to stopover at Malacca or you must persuade them 
to do so in other ways, failing which occasionally threaten them. Should 
they refuse although all measures had been taken, their departure to Johor 
should not be halted with violence. They should be allowed to continue their 
journey  
(Leupe, 1936, p. 175).   
Because of the difference in treatment of the various groups of Chinese traders, it was 
necessary to distinguish those who supported the Qing dynasty from the Chinese of the Zheng 
family in Taiwan. The Dutch captains were informed that the Chinese supporters of the Qing 
dynasty would usually shave their hair or spot short hair at the top of the head while their hair 
at the back would be stretched long. Typically, this group would wear the Manchu straw hat 
with a brim and decorations of red or silk horsetails at the top. On the other hand, The Zheng 
Chenggong Chinese had their long hair plaited at the back. Nevertheless, sometimes they would 
style their hair similar to the Manchu’s when they caught sight of Dutch ships approaching 
them on their journey. Examples of these undercover cases occurred in 1662, hence, the Dutch 
ship captains were time and again instructed to be cautious with such tricks and impersonations. 
Long-haired Chinese (in the fashion of the Ming period) who lived in Batavia, Malacca, 
Palembang and Jambi would be allowed through any port without any restrictions if they could 
show an official permit. Failing to do so would lead to their capture and being sent to Malacca 
where they would not be treated as enemies but as friends as stated by Purcell (1967). 
The Dutch, after their conquest of Malacca in 1641, also aspired to establish trade relations 
with China. They had kept the desire to open trade doors with China after their failures to 
conquer Amoy (now Xiamen) and Macau. Then, realizing potentials in Taiwan and Pescadores 
Island, they occupied the latter. From there, the Dutch launched attacks on Chinese merchant 
ships with the help of the Chinese and Japanese pirates. Hughes (1872) reports that the Dutch 
sent eight ships to explore the Malay Archipelago to confiscate, or destroy the Chinese and 
Manila vessels and whatever they had earned in the Malay Archipelago. 
After the Dutch conquest of Pecadores Island, it is noted that China’s merchant vessels “did 
not dare to trade (there) and none dared to return after trading abroad”. This was due to the 
Dutch offensive taken against Chinese junks. Because of the atrocities they committed, in 1624, 
the Fujian Governor, Nan Ju Yi sent 150 warships and 4,000 troops to force the Dutch under 
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the leadership of Martinus Sonck to leave their last defensive fortress in Pescadores. Describing 
the failure to establish trade relations with China, Sonck wrote:  
The former methods employed on the Chinese coast made all China so very 
bitter against us that we were known as murderers, intruders and 
pirates…the methods used against the Chinese have been indeed hard and 
cruel and, in my opinion, they have been such that because of them, trade 
concession could never have been obtained. 
(Chang, 1934, p. 128) 
Despite their loss, the Dutch continued their quest for trade relations with China by 
operating from Taiwan which was still under the grip of China. Eventually, they succeeded in 
making Taiwan their buffer state as they busied themselves in smuggling activities along the 
coast of China. By monopolising the trade between China and Japan and between China and 
Manila, the Dutch were always trying to explore and expand their markets in the Eastern Sea. 
For example, a few years earlier, as noted in Richard Cock’s diary written on June 8, 1617, two 
Dutch ships patrolling the sea route to Jiaozhi (Cochin-China) seized 14 or 15 Chinese ships 
sailing to Manila (Li & Liao, 1995). Later, two Dutch ships sailing along the coast of China 
also plundered 16 Chinese merchant vessels, unloaded the goods they wanted onto their ships 
and then burned some of the ships before sailing off with the rest.  
The Dutch were even willing to engage with the British solely to seize the Chinese 
merchant ships sailing to Manila. The two colonial powers often competed in the maritime 
trade, especially in the Malay Archipelago. In 1629, Pieter Nuyts, second Dutch governor at 
Fort Zeelandia in Taiwan, wrote to the VOC Board, 
We must do our utmost to destroy the chain of trade between China and 
Manila. As soon as this can be done, we are confident that Your Excellency 
(referring to the VOC Board) will see the Spaniards leaving Moluccas and 
Manila on their own consent.  
(Schurz, 1939, p. 357) 
Working in tandem with the British, the Dutch blocked traders from China from using the 
sea route along the coasts of the Malay Archipelago. All junks would be seized unless they 
wished to sail to Batavia under the terms and control of the United Netherlands State Security 
which barred all from trading with Manila, Macau, Cochin-China and the rest of India 
(Meilink-Roelofsz, 1962). The ‘piratical’ practice of the Dutch had affected China’s trade with 
Manila at the end of the Ming Dynasty era (1368-1644).  
Meanwhile, some Chinese were kidnapped by the Dutch and were dumped on the Malay 
Archipelago. As an illustration, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, founder of the Dutch colonies in Batavia 
was reported to have been involved in kidnapping the Chinese owing to the serious shortage of 
diligent Chinese workers to build Batavia as an important commercial centre in the Malay 
Archipelago. He was accused of sending his subordinates to execute kidnapping activities. In 
the ten years he held his post, thousands of Chinese were kidnapped from China’s waters but 
only a handful survived the journey to Batavia. For example, in September 1623, a total of 
1,150 Chinese were kidnapped from China. Of these, only 571 survived to Percadores, the 
stopover island for the Chinese heading to Batavia. From that, only 31 people eventually made 
it to Batavia. The difficulties faced were the long duration of the voyage and the waiver of 
socio-economic welfare of the abducted victims (Bontekoe, 2000). The brutality of the Dutch 
brought anger to the Chinese. When the Dutch occupied Malacca in 1641, the Zheng family 
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under the leadership of Zheng Chenggong established its extensive maritime commercial 
network in the coastal areas of southeast China. However, Zheng Chenggong’s efforts to 
expand his empire were often hampered by the Dutch in Taiwan. This provoked Zheng 
Chenggong’s determination to curtail the Dutch greed by expelling them from Taiwan. He was 
further infuriated by the mistreatment of the junks he had sent to trade in the Malay Archipelago 
(Andrade, 2000). 
His initial inaction can be understood when tracing the history of the Chinese in the South 
Sea. Therefore, Zheng Chenggong intervened in the overseas Chinese affairs in the Malay 
Archipelago after his triumphant founding of his government in Taiwan. He realized that his 
family depended heavily upon the overseas Chinese population to connect the lines of exchange 
within its trading network in the South Sea which became the bone of contention between the 
VOC and the Zhengs. Their conflict peaked along the routes of the Malay Archipelago. His 
efforts in protecting the interests of the Chinese were also due to the Chinese merchants being 
stranded without a home base because of the implementation of haijin by the Ming dynasty. 
But most important of all, the Malay Archipelago was a hub that could supply local products 
that were indispensable to the markets in China and Japan. While the Zheng family had finally, 
the upper hand in their competition with the Dutch to gain control of the trade in the region, 
their conflicts prompted a backlash against the Chinese traders, who were subjected to harsh 
treatment, especially by the Dutch in the heat of the dispute. Blusse (1990) is of the opinion 
that this group was quite patient in dealing with the arbitrary action of the VOC government. 
They had hoped that their passive response to the Dutch government’s poor treatment would 
change things around, but it was all for naught. The arrests of the Chinese to turn them into 
slaves, the exorbitant taxes, extortion, persecution, and even the killings committed by the VOC 
government were enough to prompt the Chinese in Batavia, for example, to feel the need to 
start a rebellion. Additionally, as war in China surged onwards, Zheng Chenggong took the 
opportunity to increase the extent of his trading monopoly by sending more junks of Chinese 
wares, gold, and silver, directly to Japan, Tonkin, Cambodia and other ports in the East and 
South Seas.  
Nara (2003) argues that Zheng Chenggong’s domination of the south eastern coast allowed 
him both to source for silk and other luxuries and to transport them to Nagasaki at a far more 
competitive price than the VOC’s. The latter, on the other hand, managed to find substitutes 
for Chinese silk by purchasing from Tonkin, present-day northern Vietnam, and Bengal. As 
Andrade (2000) has indicated, Zheng Chenggong and the VOC were thereby competing more 
and more directly, for they traded in the same ports with largely the same trade goods. Thus, it 
seems that once again the Dutch factor was significant in the Zheng family’s trading business 
with the ports in the Malay Archipelago.  
The Malay Archipelago played another important role in the region. Sailing from China on 
merchant vessels, many Chinese traders and immigrants stayed on in the Malay Archipelago 
to make it their new home while some of them waited for the interchange of monsoons before 
they continued their journey to other destinations. There were two disparate conditions in 
which a handful of them ignored the ban on outbound sea trade from China. There were those 
who would not be returning to China for they dared not do so while some could not return 
because their ships were wrecked after experiencing disasters, such as, crashes against rocks, 
being lashed by typhoons and so on. 
In spite of their intense competition, to get commodities from China, the VOC shrewdly 
pretended to maintain a friendly relationship with the Zheng family in the hope that the latter’s 
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ships would continue to sail to Taiwan and Batavia to trade. Notwithstanding the impetus for 
trade, the Dutch continued to hold and seize the Zheng family’s ships for various reasons, as 
well as try to ban their vessels from sailing to Malacca. In a letter dated June 17, 1655, the 
Governor of VOC, Joan Maetsuycker, demanded that Zheng Chenggong stop sending his ship 
to Malacca and Palembang (Huber, 2003). Facing continuous outrage from the Dutch, Zheng 
Chenggong decided to retaliate. He ordered careful searches of vessels arriving at Xiamen and 
meted out harsh punishments to anyone caught violating the embargo, confiscating their ships, 
jailing or killing their owners, and even chopping off the right hands of the crew members 
(Xing, 2010). In June 1655, Zheng Chenggong issued a decree banning Chinese ships from 
trading in Batavia, Taiwan and Manila. The purpose was to cripple the VOC economy which 
was getting a lot of positive commodity outcomes from trading activities with those ports. He 
gave a stern warning that anyone violating the ban on the trade would be put to death and their 
vessels and goods would be seized. In 1656, a Chinese ship, alleging that Dutch ships had 
mistreated his junks in the Malay Archipelago, demanded that an economic embargo be slapped 
on Dutch Formosa. This brought the economic activity in the colony to a standstill as revealed 
by Zhou and Tang (2011). 
Hence, the Netherlands had no other choice but to compromise with Koxinga. In May 1657, 
the Dutch governor in Taiwan, Frederick Coyett, sent his translator He Tingbin as a messenger 
to meet Zheng Chenggong at Amoy. Coyett through He Tingbin appealed to Koxinga to 
withdraw the ban by pledging that the Dutch would not stop the Zheng family’s ships from 
landing in Siam, Jambi, Pahang, Malacca and Palembang. At the same time, the Netherlands 
also promised to pay an annual compensation of 5,000 taels of silver, 10,000 arrow units and 
1,000 pichets of sulfur to Zheng Chenggong (Campbell, 1982). 
Unfortunately, they were just empty promises because the Dutch did not fulfill their end of 
the bargain. For example, throughout the years 1657 to 1658, four Chinese merchant ships were 
detained by the Dutch. The situation became more critical in 1658 when the Dutch heard 
rumours of Koxinga's defeat to Qing China. The Dutch once again grabbed the chance to seize 
the Chinese merchant vessels and instigated the people in Batavia and Taiwan to stop paying 
taxes to Zheng Chenggong (Zhou & Tang, 2011). 
Zheng Chenggong’s viewed this Dutch piracy action as tantamount to criticizing China for 
its maritime trade and polluting China’s integrity (Cheng, 2013). Thus, he was determined to 
expel the Dutch by taking over Taiwan. In 1661, he achieved this.  As mentioned before, the 
ongoing war in China opened up opportunities for Koxinga to expand his trading monopoly by 
sending more vessels laden with Chinese wares, gold and silver, directly to Japan, Tonkin, 
Cambodia and other ports in the East and South Seas. He and the VOC were engaged in more 
and more direct competition, trading largely in the same goods and at the same ports (Andrade, 
2000).  
4.0 ZHENG CHENGGONG’S ACTIVITIES IN THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO 
Zheng Chenggong’s invasion of Taiwan and defeat of the Dutch in 1661 put even more intra-
Asian trade into his coffers besides strengthening his already tight hold on Asia’s commercial 
network (Cook, 1998). However, the Dutch continued their trade with his family. This was 
because the Dutch realized that they still had to rely on Zheng Chenggong to access goods from 
China. There was a previous instance of a trade arrangement of this kind seen in 1628, when 
he signed an agreement with the VOC for the purchase of silk. He managed to supply 3000 
tons of sugar, 6,000 tons of silk and 5000 tons of other silk goods to the Netherlands for which 
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the Dutch paid with 3000 tons of pepper and a certain amount of cash. Through these trade 
activities, the Dutch were aware of how influential and powerful Zheng Chenggong’s empire 
was as it seemed to act as a semi-kingdom along the coast of southern China (Zhou & Tang, 
2011). 
The Zheng family imposed a tax on the private marine traders by issuing the ‘Koxinga 
Pass’. The cost to be paid by the traders in getting hold of a ‘Koxinga Pass’ was based on the 
tonnage of their ships and it could cost them between 2000 and 3000 silver bullion pits. If a 
trader refused to pay the passage cost, their vessel would be seized and destroyed. Nearly 3000 
Chinese vessels sailing to the Malay Archipelago were under the control of Zheng Chenggong. 
As affirmed by Han (1962), the Malay Archipelago continued to be the destination of focus as 
the spices produced here were indispensable in China’s market where they earned considerable 
returns. The value of the trade is estimated at 80000 – 10000 pits by Han (1962). The Malay 
Archipelago states were, according to John (2006), the Zheng family’s business partners apart 
from Japan, the Netherlands and Britain. Indeed, the Zhengs were as wealthy as the Emperor 
of China. 
The same can be observed in the intention behind the expansion of Zheng Chenggong’s 
maritime power to Manila. Having occupied Taiwan, he was interested in Manila. The annual 
trade with China was the reason Manila’s trade flourished in the early days of the Spanish 
government. According to the American scholar, William Lytle Schurz (1939), the Eastern-
traded goods brought to Manila, became the main base for trade in warships with Mexico and 
set the economy of this colony for more than two centuries. The entrenchment of the Chinese 
in trading activities in the region is confirmed by this description, “The Chinese in Manila had 
monopolised the trade and commerce of the colonies so much so that the Spaniards who wanted 
to enter the business world were forced to demand the eviction and exclusion of the Chinese.” 
(Schurz, 1939, p. 93) 
Fr. Victorio Ricci, an Italian Dominican missionary, was sent by Koxinga to Manila as his 
representative.  He arrived at Manila on May 18, 1662 to deliver to Governor Manriques de 
Lara, Koxinga’s message which demanded from the Spanish officials, submission and tributes. 
However, the governor considered this demand as an abusive act and immediately made 
preparations for war. The Chinese residents in Manila, who saw impending warfare, were 
worried about their safety. Many of them sailed to Formosa. In the meantime, Zheng 
Chenggong’s success in getting rid of the Dutch from Taiwan intensified the latter’s desire to 
take revenge on him. The Dutch regarded all Chinese as their enemies. Therefore, the Dutch 
government’s policy in Malacca continued to be anti-Chinese. Any Chinese sailing across the 
Singapore Straits and the estuary of the Johor River would be arrested and their vessels seized. 
This explains why during the Dutch governance of 183 years in Malacca (1641-1795 and 1818-
1825), there was only a small Chinese population in Malacca for fear of the Dutch anti-Chinese 
policy. In addition, many Chinese merchants tried to avoid passing through the Malacca Straits 
because they worried that their ships would be detained and confiscated and their crew’s lives 
endangered. 
It was not surprising that after 1641, Malacca under the Dutch administration was seen as 
a poorer port than before. Although it retained its status as a stopover port, it had ceased to be 
an entreport for the exchange of goods between the Eastern and Western traders. On the verge 
of its decline, Malacca was still visited by ships from all the ports in East Asia but most of them 
came here to provide food, clothing and other basic necessities for the urban residents. On the 
bright side, with their position as the master of Malacca, their main base, the Dutch successfully 
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expanded and strengthened their influence into the interior of the Malay Peninsula, in 
particular. They managed to dominate several trade routes in Perak, Kedah, Johor and Acheh. 
In 1789, when the French revolution broke out, William V of the Dutch Republic fled to 
London. To prevent the colonies from falling into the hands of the French, the Dutch 
surrendered their possessions abroad, which included Malacca, to the British for temporary 
administration. After the French Revolutionary War ended in 1815, the Dutch repossessed 
Malacca. With the opening of the British settlements in Penang and Singapore in 1786 and 
1819 respectively, interest in Malacca had waned. In 1824, the British and Dutch signed the 
London Treaty whereby the British exchanged their domination of Bencoolen, Sumatra for 
Malacca. Therefore, the withdrawal of the Dutch from Malacca marked the beginning of British 
rule in the Malay Peninsula. 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
The Zheng family, therefore, is credited for playing vital role in establishing and further 
developing the private trading activities of the Chinese merchants in the Malay World during 
the 17th century. The ‘maritime prohibitions’ (haijin) imposed by the Ming Dynasty were the 
major catalysts among other factors for the rapid expansion of such private trading activities. 
As it is, the trading restrictions provided the opportunity for the Zheng family to explore the 
prospects of using their own private networks to meet the high demand by the Chinese and 
Japanese traders for the local products available only in the states of the Malay Archipelago. 
Despite the vibrancy of the Zheng family's trading activities, they were disrupted by the 
emergence of foreign powers, especially the Dutch, who were also bent on dominating the 
maritime routes in the Malay Archipelago. Since these routes especially the Malacca Straits, 
were not only strategically positioned but also served as the most important trade route between 
China and India, the Dutch and Spaniards imposed restrictions to curb the activities of the 
Chinese traders in Manila, Batavia and Malacca. This was also because the Chinese merchants 
in the Malay Archipelago were viewed as supporters of the Zheng family despite the fact that 
it was not the case. However, to the Zhengs in their efforts to expand their trade empire and 
network, the states of the Malay Archipelago continued to be their happy hunting ground to 
assemble the local products for their markets. Simultaneously, the Zheng family, especially 
Zheng Chenggong, took the decisive move to rescue the Chinese merchants from being 
persecuted by the Dutch. Hence, the involvement of the Zheng family, as they challenged the 
Dutch for control of the trade in the Malay Archipelago during the 17th century, became 
increasingly significant and more prominent. 
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